Hubungan Substitusi Real Earning Management dan Accrual Earning Management terhadap Perilaku Pajak Agresif pada Perusahaan Kepemilikan Keluarga di Indonesia

  • Indah Masri Universitas Pancasila, Jakarta Selatan, DKI Jakarta
DOI: https://doi.org/10.35838/jrap.2022.009.01.08
Abstract views: 334 | PDF downloads: 343
Keywords: Real Earning Management, Accrual Earning Management, Perilaku Pajak Agresif, Kepemilikan Keluarga

Abstract

ABSTRACT

This study looks at the effect of real earnings management (REM) and accrual earnings management (AEM) on tax aggressive behavior, and how the role of family companies on earnings management is applied to that relationship. The study was conducted on manufacturing companies during the period 2016 to 2019, with a total of 78 companies observing 312 company-years. With pool panel balance analysis, the research results show that in accordance with hypothesis 1 to hypothesis 5, that companies that do REM will tend to behave less aggressively than companies that do AEM, because there are no company limitations to do AEM, so companies that will do AEM tend to behave aggressive tax. In the test results in favor of family companies showing a tendency to aggressive behavior in Sari's research (2010). On the other hand, when family firms perform earnings management for tax purposes, they tend to switch to REM rather than AEM. These results contribute to earnings management behavior that is a substitute for accrual and real earnings management to aggressive tax behavior.

ABSTRAK

Penelitian ini melihat pengaruh real earning management serta accrual earning management pada perilaku pajak agresif, dan bagaimana peran perusahaan keluarga atas manajemen laba yang diterapkan entitas pada hubungan itu. Riset dilakukan pada perusahaan manufaktur selama periode 2016 hingga 2019, dengan total 78 perusahaan observasi 312 perusahaan-tahun.  Dengan analisis pool panel balance, hasil penelitian menunjukkan sesuai dengan hipotesis 1 hingga hipotesis 5, bahwa perusahaan yang melakukan REM akan cenderung kurang berperilaku pajak agresif daripada perusahaan yang melakukan AEM, karena belum adanya keterbatasan perusahaan untuk melakukan AEM, sehingga perusahaan yang melakukan AEM cenderung akan berperilaku pajak agresif. Pada hasil pengujian di Perusahaan keluarga menampilkan kecenderungan perilaku pajak agresif mendukung penelitian Sari (2010). Sebaliknya ketika perusahaan keluarga melakukan manajemen laba untuk tujuan pajak cenderung akan beralih melakukan manajemen laba secara real daripada secara akrual. Hasil ini memberikan kontribusi atas perilaku manajemen laba yang bersifat substitusi atas real dan accrual earning management terhadap perilaku pajak agresif.

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Published
2022-07-01
How to Cite
Masri, I. (2022). Hubungan Substitusi Real Earning Management dan Accrual Earning Management terhadap Perilaku Pajak Agresif pada Perusahaan Kepemilikan Keluarga di Indonesia. JRAP (Jurnal Riset Akuntansi Dan Perpajakan), 9(1), 101 - 114. https://doi.org/10.35838/jrap.2022.009.01.08